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VICE-A-VERDICT: LEGALLY INCONSISTENT JURY
VERDICTS SHOULD NOT STAND IN MARYLAND
I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider this situation-Emily is charged with possession of a
controlled dangerous substance (CDS) and possession of a CDS
with intent to distribute. It intuitively follows that in order to be
convicted of possession with intent to distribute, Emily must first
be convicted of possession because actual possession is an integral
element of the greater crime. I Common sense indicates that an
acquittal for possession and a conviction for possession with intent
to distribute would be reversed by the appellate courts, as the jury
has essentially indicated that the crime has both been committed
and not committed at the same time. 2
Verdicts such as this are called inconsistent verdicts.
Inconsistent verdicts defy more than logic-they run contrary to
many principles of law. As mandated by the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Constitution, each element of a crime must be
proven by the government beyond a reasonable doubt in order to
convict the accused. 3 Therefore, if a jury acquits Emily of simple
possession, but convicts her of possession with intent to distribute,
then it follows that the government has not proven simple
possession beyond a reasonable doubt. Without proving this
element, the crime of possession with intent to distribute cannot
logically have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as simple
possession is an integral element of distribution. Furthermore,
verdict inconsistencies such as this may signify that the jurors were
not truly convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 4
I.

In People v. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d 617,619 n.2 (N.Y. 1981), the court provided an
excellent example:
[If] a defendant is charged with two crimes: charge I requires
proof of elements A, Band C; charge 2 requires proof of elements A,
B, C and D. A conviction on charge 2 would be repugnant to an
acquittal on charge I as the latter verdict would necessarily involve a
finding that at least one of the essential elements of charge 2 was not
proven.

2.
3.

4.

Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent
Verdicts, III HARV. L. REV. 771, 773-74 (1998).
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
Steven T. Wax, Inconsistent and Repugnant Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 713, 739 (1979).
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Alarmingly, verdicts like this are automatically affirmed by
most appellate courts. 5 In fact, almost every state in the union has
chosen to follow the Supreme Court's unanimous decision
concerning inconsistent jury verdicts. 6 However, this is not
necessarily evidence of the doctrine's efficiency or fairness.
Rather, it speaks to the extent that this problem permeates our
judicial system and the urgent need for reform.
This comment will first discuss what constitutes an inconsistent
verdict, and the Supreme Court's rationale for allowing
inconsistent verdicts to stand.? Secondly, it will examine the
reasons why inconsistent verdicts occur and explain why these
reasons are unworthy ofprotection. 8 Next it will detail Maryland's
approach to inconsistent verdicts. 9 It will then focus upon Alaska,
New York, and Florida-the only states which allow inconsistent
verdicts to be reversed. IO This comment will then explain each
jurisdiction's approach to inconsistent verdicts and use lessons
gathered from each jurisdiction's practices in formulating an
approach for Maryland. II Next it will detail a more concrete
definition to use in identifying inconsistent verdicts. 12 This
comment will conclude by explaining possible alternatives to the
Supreme Court's means of dealing with inconsistent verdicts, and
it will propose the best course of action for Maryland. 13
II. WHAT IS AN INCONSISTENT VERDICT AND WHY ARE
THEY UPHELD?
A.

What is an Inconsistent Verdict?

Inconsistency in the verdict is a fairly fluid concept, which has
eluded specific and uniform definition. 14
Generally, it is
"understood to mean some logical impossibility or improbability
[that] is implicit in the jury's findings as to the various counts of
the indictment or [the] information [presented at trial].,,15

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
II.

12.
13.
14.
15.

Muller, supra note 2, at 774.
See W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdict as Between
Different Counts of Indictment or Information, 18 A.L.R.3d 259, 274-79 (1968).
See also Tucker, 431 N.E.2d at 618.
See infra Pan II.B-C.
See infra Part Ill.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Parts VII-VIII.
See Wax, supra note 4, at 713.
People v. Frye, 898 P.2d 559, 566 n.9 (Colo. 1995) (quoting Shipley, supra note
6, at 287).
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Consequently, inconsistent verdicts may arise from both factual l6
and legal considerations. 17 Generally, there are two forms of
legally inconsistent verdicts-multiple count inconsistencies as to
a single defendant and inconsistencies between multiple
defendants. 18 Multiple defendant inconsistencies occur when the
jury acquits all but one defendant for a crime, which by its very
While multiple
definition requires more than one actor. 19
defendant inconsistencies and factual inconsistencies present
serious issues, this comment will focus only on multiple count
inconsistencies.
Defining a multiple count inconsistency is fairly complicated,z°
Some identify multiple count inconsistencies as occurring where
"an acquittal on one count negates a necessary element for
conviction upon another count.,,21 This, generally, is the simplest
form of an inconsistent verdict and occurs when a defendant is
convicted of a greater count and acquitted of a lesser-included
offense,22 which this comment will refer to as a "lesser-included
inconsistency."
Arguably, another type of multiple count
inconsistency occurs when a defendant is convicted of a compound
offense, but acquitted of the necessary predicate offense. 23 While
16.

17.
18.
19.

20.
21.

22.

23.

A factually inconsistent verdict occurs when juries render different verdicts on
crimes with distinct elements when there was only one set of proof given at trial,
which makes the verdicts illogical. Wax, supra note 4, at 740. For example,
suppose John is charged with the rape and murder of Sue and that both crimes
were committed against Sue on the same night by one person. Assuming that the
state does not use the felony murder theory, the conviction of John for murder,
but his acquittal for rape does not produce a legal inconsistency because the
elements of the two crimes do not overlap. On the other hand, if the only
evidence presented by the defense was an out-of-state alibi for John then the
jury's only logical alternatives would have been to either convict for both
offenses, if they did not believe his alibi, or to acquit on both offenses if they did
believe his alibi. If, based on such an alibi, the jury stiU convicted John of
murder and acquitted him of rape, the verdict would be considered factually
inconsistent because it makes no sense in light of the facts raised at trial.
Frye, 898 P.2d at 566 n.9.
Muller, supra note 2, at 778.
See id. at 779. Crimes which require more than one actor include conspiracy,
adultery, fornication, miscegenation, bigamy and dueling. Id. (citing lanelli v.
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 781 n.13, 782 (1975)). Probably the most
commonly prosecuted example in today's society is the crime of conspiracy.
Muller, supra note 2, at 779.
See Wax, supra note 4, at 713.
Gonzalez v. State, 440 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. Dis!. Ct. App. \983). See also
Muller, supra note 2, at 778-79 (giving an example of a case of inconsistency
occurring in a case with a compound charge).
Wax, supra note 4, at 728. See, e.g., People v. Carbonell, 358 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y.
1976) (convicting defendant of robbery but acquitting him of petit larceny). See
also supra Part I. (fact hypothetical).
See, e.g., Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 53, 512 A.2d 358,361 (1986) (finding that if
a jury acquits an accused of a felony or crime of violence, but convicts the
accused of use of a handgun in the commission of such felony or crime of
violence, the jury has rendered inconsistent verdicts).
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some jurisdictions refer to this type of multiple count inconsistency
as a "true" or "legal" inconsistency,24 this comment will refer to it
as a "compound inconsistency."

B.

The United States Supreme Court's Stand on Inconsistent
Verdicts

In 1932 the Supreme Court held in Dunn v. United States,25 that
criminal defendants who were convicted by a jury on one count
could not attack that conviction on the basis of the jury's rendering
an acquittal on another count. 26 The Court further held that
consistency in the verdict was not necessary and that each count of
an indictment should be treated as if it were in a separate
indictment. 27 The Court noted that these verdicts could be the
result of compromise, mistake, or lenity but that these "verdicts
cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters.,,28
Fifty-two years later the Supreme Court noted in United States
v. PoweU29 that its decision in Dunn could be explained as "a
recognition of the jury's historic function ... [to act] as a check
against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by the Executive
Branch.,,30 In Powell, the Court recognized that inconsistent
verdicts are a clear indication that the jury has disobeyed the
court's instructions?! However, as "it is unclear whose ox has
been gored" by this disobedience, the Court chose to allow
inconsistent verdicts to stand. 32 Essentially, the Court argued that
since the mistake could have occurred to the detriment of either the
defendant or the state, the defendant should not be allowed to
challenge a conviction as the state may not challenge an
acquittal. 33 Furthermore, the Court rejected the possibility of
24.
25.
26..

27.
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Gonzalez, 440 So. 2d. at 515.
284 U.S. 390 (1932).
Id. at 393-94. Justice Butler, however, disagreed with the court's holding stating
in his dissent, "[olne accused in different counts of an indictment of the same
crime, there being no difference in the means alleged to have been employed,
may not be adjudged guilty on a verdict of conviction on one count and of
acquittal on the other." Id. at 402 (Butler, 1., dissenting).
Id. at 393.
ld. at 393-94.
469 U.S. 57 (1984) (upholding Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932».
Defendant, Betty Lou Powell, was convicted of the compound offense of using a
telephone to facilitate other felonies. !d. at 59-60. The jury acquitted her of all
the charged underlying felonies. ld. Powell argued, and the government
conceded, that these verdicts were inconsistent as it is necessary to prove at least
one underlying felony beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict the accused
for the compound offense of telephone facilitation. Id. at 60-61 n.5.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. at 65-66.
Id. at 65. The Government may not appeal a judgment of not guilty against a
criminal defendant. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989),
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individual assessments of inconsistent verdicts because this would
require speculation as to the jury's deliberations. 34 Finally, the
Court held that criminal defendants receive sufficient protection
against jury irrationality and error by the sufficiency of the
evidence review which is conducted at the trial and appellate
leve1. 35 Additionally, the Court explicitly found that there was no
exception to this rule when a criminal defendant is acquitted of the
predicate felony, but convicted of the compound felony.36 The
Court argues that reversing convictions of this nature would
require the assumption that the acquittal on the predicate felony
was the one that the jury "really meant," when all the court truly
knows is that the verdict is inconsistent. 37 The Court ultimately
concluded that "the Government's inability to invoke review, the
general reluctance to inquire into the workings of the jury, and the
possible exercise of lenity-suggest that the best course to take is
simply to insulate jury verdicts from review on this ground.,,38
C.

The Supreme Court's Reasoning-faulty or formidable?

Essentially, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Powell consists
of three major points: (1) because there is no way to determine
abrogated on other grounds by Hudson v, United States, 522 U.S, 93 (1997), See
also U,S, CONST, amend, V (providing that "nor shall any person be subject for
34.

the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
Powell, 469 U.S. at 66. Federal courts have resisted the urge to inquire into jury
deliberations in order to preserve an element of finality, Id, at 67. To enforce
this policy decision, the Federal Rules of Evidence state that jurors are generally
incompetent to testify about jury proceedings, FED. R. EVID, 606(b), In
McDonald v. Pless, the Court explained the importance of such a prohibition:
[L Jet it once be established that verdicts solemnly made and
publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside on the
testimony of those who took part in their publication and all verdicts
could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of
discovering something which might invalidate the finding, Jurors
would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to
secure from them evidence of facts which might establish misconduct
sufficient to set aside a verdict If evidence thus secured could be thus
used, the result would be to make what was intended to be a private
deliberation, the constant subject of public investigation, , , .
238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915).

35.

36,

37,

38.

Powell, 469 U.S. at 67. This review determines whether the evidence presented
at trial was sufficient to support a rational determination of guilt, Id. See also
infra Part II.e.3,
Powell, 469 U.S, at 67-68 (stating that such an exception would "threaten[] to

swallow the rule"), The Court explicitly noted, however, that its opinion on
inconsistent verdicts did not apply to cases whcre a defendant is convicted of two
crimes in a situation where a finding of guilt on one count excludes a finding of
guilt on another count. ld at 69 n.8 (citing United States v. Daigle, 149 P, Supp,
409 (D,D.C. 1957) (holding that finding a defendant guilty of larceny and
embezzlement for the same act cannot stand so the court could direct an acquittal
of the larceny count), aff'd per curiam, 248 F.2d 608 (U,S. App. D.e. 1957».
Powell, 469 U.S. at 68.
ld. at 68-69,
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why a jury rendered an inconsistent verdict, such verdicts should
be upheld in the interest of protecting lenity;39 (2) because the
government may not appeal inconsistent acquittals, it is only fair to
prevent defendants from appealing inconsistent convictions; 40 and
(3) any harm that could result from an inconsistent verdict is
prevented by sufficiency ofthe evidence review. 41
1.

Inconsistent Verdicts Should Be Upheld in Order to Protect
Lenity

The Supreme Court's first argument is perhaps its weakest, as it
overstates the value of lenity42 and underestimates the price of
allowing inconsistent verdicts rendered by mistake or compromise
43
to stand.
Essentially, the Court refuses to reverse inconsistent
verdicts under the rather hypocritical argument that it is for the
defendant's own good as reversal would endanger jury lenity.44
But if jury lenity results only in acquittals, as the Court assumes it
does,45 how would appellate reversal of inconsistent convictions
endanger the concept of lenity?46 Rationally, it appears that the
only action which could truly endanger a defendant's chance for
lenity would be appellate reversal of inconsistent acquittals, which
is not a real threat as it is precluded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 47
Perhaps most damaging is what the Court is willing to accept
and impose upon criminal defendants in order to protect lenity.48
While lenity is a plausible explanation for inconsistent verdicts,
these verdicts may also be explained by confusion, mistake or
compromise. 49 Because the Court has no way of knowing how
often verdicts are the result of lenity, the Court gambles with
possibly remote odds to protect lenity at the cost of establishing the
same protections for jury confusion, mistake, and compromise as
well. 56
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.

Id. at 65-67. Muller refers to this as the argument from uncertainty. Muller,
supra note 2, at 794.
Powell, 469 U.S. at 65. Muller refers to this as the Court's argument from equity.
Muller, supra note 2, at 806.
Powell, 469 U.S. at 67. Muller calls this the Court's argument from remedy.
Muller, supra note 2, at 812.
See infra Part lILe. (discussing reasons why jury lenity is not necessarily worth
protecting).
See Muller, supra note 2, at 794-806.
Id. at 795.
See Powell, 469 U.S. at 66.
Muller, supra note 2, at 794-95.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 798.
Powell, 469 at 65. See infra Part lILA-B. (discussing why verdicts rendered
through compromise or mistake arc unworthy of protecting).
Muller, supra note 2, at 795.
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Defendants May Not Appeal Inconsistent Convictions
Because the State May Not Appeal Acquittals

The Court's second argument is, on its face, only an attempt to
make the playing field between the individual and the state more
even. In actuality, this argument goes against constitutional
principles and alters the balance between the individual and the
state in an unfair manner. 51 The Bill of Rights provides criminal
defendants with many constitutional rights that protect them from
However, instead of honoring the defendant's
the state. 52
advantage as a constitutional mandate to protect individuals from a
powerful state, the Court shields the state from the fuJI weight of
the Bill of Rights' guarantees and strips defendants of a ground for
The Court's decision, instead of preventing the
appeal. 53
defendant from gaining an undue advantage, allows the state to
shirk its burden that is imposed by the Bill of Rights. 54
3.

Defendants Receive Sufficient Protection from "Sufficiency of
the Evidence" Review

The Court's third argument, that defendants already receive
sufficient protection from jury irrationality55 is also misplaced as
"sufficiency review is simply too toothless and too deferential to
the jury and its irrational verdict.,,56 In Jackson v. Virginia,s7 the
court held that in order to ensure a jury's compliance with the
reasonable doubt standard, appellate courts should determine
whether there was sufficient evidence to reasonably warrant a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 58 This test requires
judges to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the state
and to ask whether a rational trier of fact could have found all of
the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 59 The court
noted that this test infringed upon jury discretion only to the extent
needed to ensure "the fundamental protection of due process of

52.

[d. at 806.
!d. See U.S. CaNST. amend. V (including the right to indictment by a grand jury,

51.

53.

the right against self-incrimination, the right to due process of law, and the right
to be protected from double jeopardy); U.S. CaNST. amend. VI (including the
right to counsel, the right to a speedy trial, the right to subpoena witnesses, the
right to confront witnesses, and the right to an impartial jury).
Muller, supra note 2, at 806-07.

54.

Jd.

55.
56.
57.

Powell, 469 U.S. at 67.
Muller, supra note 2, at 824.
443 U.S. 307 (1979).
[d. at317-18.
!d. at 319. See also Hodge v. United States, 13 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1926) (viewing
evidence in favor of government to see if testimony is sufficient to warrant
conviction in appeal of conviction); Fitzgerald v. United States, 29 F.2d 881 (6th
Cir. 1929) (viewing evidence in favor of government to see if sufficient evidence
warrants conviction in appeal of conviction).

58.

59.

Baltimore Law Review

402

[Vol. 35

law.,,60 While this test does not advocate blind trust of jury
verdicts, it still shows substantial deference to the jury's
determination 61 and is rarely used to overturn convictions. 62

TIT. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE EXPLANATIONS
PROVIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT
It would appear that juries can reach inconsistent verdicts in
innumerable ways, but in fact, there are only a few, and each
constitutes a violation of the court's instructions. 63 Juries deliver
inconsistent verdicts based on three general reasons: mistake,
compromise, or lenity.64 These three reasons, however, are
unworthy of protection by the Supreme Court. The following
section will explain how each may arise and discuss the problems
associated with protecting mistake, compromise, and lenity.
A.

Mistake

The most obvious reason for a jury to render an inconsistent
verdict is through simple mistake. The jury may misunderstand
the court's instructions on the law or improperly apply the facts to
the law. 65 For example, a jury might mistakenly believe that it is
not necessary to convict on the predicate felony in order to find the
defendant guilty of a compound crime. 66 While errors of this sort
are unintentional and presumably not committed in bad faith, they
still amount to a failure to follow the court's instructions and
undeniably hurt defendants. 67
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has never insinuated that one
of the benefits of our jury system is that juries are allowed to make
mistakes and apply the law incorrectly without disruption. 68 In
fact, the Supreme Court has taken pains to carefully examine jury
instructions, which implies that confusion or error that could arise
from those instructions is of great concern. 69
60.
61.

62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
Muller, supra note 2, at 823. The Court noted, "the relevant question is whether .
. . any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
Jon O. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt," 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 989
(1993) (stating that courts "occasionally" find that the evidence was insufficient,
but that the test is usually used "to overturn a conviction on a particular count of a
multi-count indictment, rather than to exonerate a defendant entirely").
Muller, supra note 2, at 781-85.
Powell v. United States, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984).
Muller, supra note 2, at 782.
!d.
Jd. at 782, 796.
Jd. at 795.
Id.; Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979) (holding that jury
instructions violate due process if they fail to give effect to the requirement that
the state must prove every element of an offense). See also Wax, supra note 4, at
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Compromise

Compromise verdicts are perhaps the most troubling means of
reaching an inconsistent verdict, as they constitute a willful and
conscious disregard of the court's instructions. 7o Compromise
verdicts arise when, in an attempt to reach a verdict after being
unable to achieve unanimity, the jury essentially splits the
difference and negotiates a verdict. 7! In civil cases, compromise
verdicts manifest themselves in damage awards,72 and in criminal
cases, compromise verdicts "relate[] to [the] number[] of counts
and the lesser included offenses.,,73
On its face, jury compromise does not appear that harmful-it
resolves cases, clears dockets, and prevents mistrials. 74
Compromise verdicts, however, are contrary to the court's
instructions and demean the reasonable doubt standard. 75 In
Maryland, juries are required to render unanimous verdicts/ 6 but
are specifically warned "not [to] surrender your honest belief as to
the weight or effect of the evidence only because of the opinion of
your fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of reaching a verdict.,,77
Compromise verdicts also dishonor the requirement of true
unanimity because each member has essentially surrendered his or
her honestly held belief as to whether the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt in the name of expediency and false
unanimi ty. 78
Furthermore, when a compromise verdict is rendered, the
criminal defendant is always harmed by this sacrifice of the
reasonable doubt standard due to a violation of his or her
Ironically, this harm is
constitutionally protected rights. 79
unnecessary as a mistrial does not automatically allow defendants
to "get off'-if the jury followed the courts instructions and a

70.
71.

72.

73.
74.

75.
76.
77.

78.
79.

741 (stating that the importance of jury instructions stems from "the fact that the
judge's charge ... is often the controlling factor in jury deliberations").
Muller, supra note 2, at 784.
Jd. at 782.
See, e.g, McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 265-66 (1915) (The jury reached a
damage award by averaging the sum of what each juror believed the plaintiff was
entitled to receive).
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,235 (1978).
Muller, supra note 2, at 784, 796.
Jd.

MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.03 (2005) ("Your verdict
must represent the considered judgment of each juror and must be unanimous. ").
Jd § 2.01 (emphasis added). Therefore, when a jury renders a verdict via
compromise, they are in direct violation of the court's instructions. See id.
Muller, supra note 2, at 784.
Jd at 796.
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hung jury resulted, the government is not precluded from retrying
the defendant on those charges. 8o
C.

Lenity

The final way inconsistent verdicts may be rendered is through
an exercise of what the Supreme Court refers to as "lenity.,,81
Lenity occurs when a jury acquits a defendant even though it is
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guiltY
There are generally two instances in which lenity is exercisedwhen the jury believes that the law punishes conduct which is not
morally blameworthl 3 or when the jury believes that this
particular defendant should not be punished for violating the law. 84
The Supreme Court, however, makes a critical assumption,
presumably due to the ambiguity of the general verdict, that
inconsistent verdicts are, in fact, the result oflenity.85 The Court's
80.

81.

82.

83.
84.

85.

See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978) (stating that mistrials
based upon a jury's inability to reach a unanimous verdict is the "classic basis"
for declaring a mistrial); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (stating
that mistrials based upon hung juries are "prototypical example[s]" of the
"manifest necessity" which is generally required to overcome the double jeopardy
bar to a second trial).
Powell v. United States, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984); Muller, supra note 2, at 784. In
his article in support of upholding inconsistent verdicts, Alexander Bickel
explained the importance of permitting juries to render inconsistent verdicts due
to the value oflenity:
The law states duties and liabilities in black and white terms.
Human actions are frequently not as clean-cut. Judges themselves
sometimes undertake, in sentencing, the search for a middle ground
between the absolutes of conviction and acquittal. To deny the jury a
share in this endeavor is to deny the essence of thc jury's function, in
which "law and justice do not coincide."
Alexander M. Bickel, Comment, Judge and Jury ~ Inconsistent Verdicts in the
Federal Courts, 63 HARV. L. REv. 649, 651-52 (1950) (footnotes omitted).
Muller, supra note 2, at 784. See Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury
Nullification, 82 VA. L. REv. 253, 253-54 (1996) (calling this phenomenon
"nullification" and describing it as a jury's power to "acquit against the
evidence").
Muller, supra note 2, at 784; Leipold, supra note 82, at 297-98.
Muller, supra note 2, at 784; Leipold, supra note 82, at 301-02 (explaining that
jury nulIification occurs "when the harm caused by the defendant is de minimis,
when the victim's conduct contributed to the harm, when jurors believe the
defendant already has suffered enough, and when the government appears to have
acted improperly").
Muller, supra note 2, at 805; Wax, supra note 4, at 739. In Steckler v. United
States, the court said, "[w]e interpret the acquittal as no more than [the jury's]
assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but to which they
were disposed through lenity. That the conviction may havc been the result of
some compromise is, of course, possible ... " 7 F.2d 59, 60 (2d CiT. 1925).
Contra Chad W. Coulter, Comment, The Unnecessary Rule oj Consistency in
Conspiracy Trials, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 223, 241 (1986) (stating that relying on the
Supreme Court's assumption "does not reflect a wholesale rejection of
defendants' rights, but a prudent balancing of the role of the jury and the need to
ensure the accuracy of criminal convictions").
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reliance on this assumption, in the words of one commentator, "is a
serious breach of the systemic protections designed to ensure a
sound basis for conviction for criminal defendants.,,86
Additionally, the true value of lenity has been greatly
exaggerated by the Supreme Court through its willingness to
accept compromise and mistake verdicts in order to protect
lenity.87 Perhaps most importantly, the Court wrongly assumes
that the exercise of lenity only burdens the government. 88 The
Court fails to recognize that the power to exercise lenity inherently
includes the power to render verdicts out of hostility or ~rejudice
as they are "opposite faces ofthe coin of jury discretion.,,8
Another important consideration is that jury lenity is not
constitutional in nature90 and the Court has previously held that
defendants are not entitled to a jury which will set aside the law. 9l
Moreover, inconsistent verdicts based on lenity are a disregard of
the court's instructions. 92 Jury instructions require that if guilt is
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be
While a jury's exercise of lenity cannot be
convicted. 93

86.
87.

88.
89.

90.
91.

92.

93.

Wax, supra note 4, at 739.
See Powell v. United States, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984) (discussing why verdicts
based on lenity should be protected). See supra Part IIl.A-B. (discussing why
mistake and compromise are not worthy of protection by the Court).
Powell, 469 U.S. at 66; Muller, supra note 2, at 794.
Muller, supra note 2, at 803-05; Leipold, supra note 82, at 304 ("For every case
where the jury extends mercy to a deserving defendant, there may well be another
(or two, or five others) where the verdict is based on improper considerations.").
See, e.g., Reed v. State, 103 So. 97 (Ala. Ct. App. 1925) (reversing the conviction
of a black man for violating miscegenation statute since his white wife was
acquitted and Alabama law held it was a crime that could not be committed by
one person).
Muller, supra note 2, at 797.
Jd. In Spar! v. United States, the Court said,
Public and private safety alike would be in peril if the principle
be established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the
law as expounded to them by the court, and become a law unto
themselves. Under such a system ... jurymen, untrained in the law,
would determine questions affecting life, liberty, or property
according to such legal principles as, in their judgment, were
applicable to the particular case being tried.
156 U.S. 51, 101 (1895). The Court pointed out that "the result would be that the
enforcement of the law against criminals[,] and the protection of citizens against
unjust and groundless prosecutions, would depend entirely upon juries
uncontroiled by any settled, fixed, legal principles." !d. at 101-02.
See United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 614 (2d CiT. 1997) (stating that
"nullification is, by definition, a violation of a juror's oath to apply the law as
instructed by the court").
Muller, supra note 2, at 785.
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prevented,94 this does not necessarily make its exercise lawful or
desirable. 95
Considering these many issues-namely, the exaggerated value
of lenity and the under appreciated cost of compromise and
mistake-the Court's decision to protect lenity appears
incongruous.
IV. MARYLAND HAS ADOPTED THE HOLDING OF
POWELL
This comment will now discuss Maryland's approach to
inconsistent verdicts in both criminal and civil cases. It will also
explain Maryland's policy on jury instructions regarding
consistency in the verdict.
A.

Inconsistent Verdicts in Criminal Cases

The Supreme Court's ruling in Powell was not based on
constitutional considerations and, therefore, the states are not
bound by the Court's decision. 96 Despite its freedom to hold
otherwise, thc Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the holding
in Powelt7 and has consistently rejected inconsistent verdicts as a
sufficient reason to void convictions. 98 The court has continued to
uphold these verdicts due to the "unique role of the jury" in our
justice system. 99 The court has further held that such verdicts will
be accepted without proof of an actual irregularity. toO However,
inconsistent verdicts in Maryland will not be upheld if there was
insufficient evidence or if it is apparent from the record that the
94.

95.

Id. at 785-86. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (stating that
a verdict of acquittal is final and that the state may not obtain a new trial through
an appeal even if the verdict appears erroneous).
Muller, supra note 2, at 786; United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam). The Washington court stated,

A jury has no more "right" to find a "guilty" defendant "not
guilty" than it has to find a "not guilty" defendant "guilty," and the
fact that the former cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter
can be, does not create a right out of the power to misapply the law.
96.

97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 494.
United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984) ("[N]othing in the Constitution
would require such a protection, and we therefore address the problem only under
our supervisory powers over the federal criminal process[.]"); Wilson v. Turpin, 5
Gill 56, 58 (Md. 1847) (holding that the decisions of the Supreme Court
construing the federal constitution and acts of Congress are conclusive and
binding upon the states).
Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 54,512 A.2d 358,362 (1986).
Ford v. State, 274 Md. 546, 552, 337 A.2d 81, 85 (1975). See Wright v. State,
307 Md. 552, 576, 515 A.2d 1157, 1169 (\986).
Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 594-95, 479 A.2d 1344,1349 (1984).
Hoffert v. State, 319 Md. 377, 389, 572 A.2d 536, 542 (1990) (Chasanow, J.,
dissenting). See also Ledbetter v. State, 224 Md. 271, 273-74, 167 A.2d 596,
597-98 (1961).
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jury was misled by the court's instructions and that the error did
lol
not result from lenity, compromise, or mistake.
While an
inconsistent acquittal on one count does not prevent a conviction
upon another count from standing,102 Maryland recognizes the
exception noted by the Supreme Court and requires that a finding
of guilt on two incompatible counts will be declared invalid. 103
Interestingly, inconsistent verdicts which are rendered by the
court and not by the jury are considered reversible error in
Maryland. 104 The court explained this policy by pointing out that it
would make no sense to require judges to give instructions to juries
which explain the law and then give the judges license to ignore
those rules. 105
B.

Inconsistent Verdicts in Civil Cases

It is also interesting to consider Maryland's approach to
inconsistent verdicts in civil cases. In the recent case of Southern
Management Corporation v. Taha,106 the Court of Appeals held it
was error for the trial court to allow irreconcilably inconsistent
verdicts to stand in civil cases. I 07 However, the court pointed out
the irrationality of this holding by noting that the same jury
interplay occurs when rendering a civil verdict as when a criminal
verdict is rendered and that this interplay allows for the same
opportunities for mistake, compromise, or lenity.108 Furthermore,
the court specifically added, in a footnote, that "[w]e leave for
101.
102.
103.

104.
105.
106.
107.

108.

Bates v. State, 127 Md. App. 678, 695-96, 736 A.2d 407,416 (1999).
Leet v. State, 203 Md. 285, 293, 100 A.2d 789, 793 (1953).
See supra note 36 and accompanying text for Supreme Court's exception. See
also Heinze v. State, 184 Md. 613, 617,42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945). In Heinze, the
defendants were charged with stealing twenty dollars and with receiving twenty
dollars they knew to be stolen and were convicted of both. Id. at 615, 42 A.2d at
129. The court held that a thief cannot be guilty of the crime of receiving stolen
goods which he himself has stolen, and a guilty receiver of those stolen goods.
ld. at 617, 42 A.2d at 130. Therefore, the court held the verdict "inconsistent in
law." Id. But see State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501,516-17,515 A.2d 465,472-73
(1986) (holding that the elements for the crimes of assault with intent to murder
and assault with intent to maim, disfigure, or disable are mutually exclusive or
inconsistent and that the conviction for assault with intent to maim, disfigure, or
disable should be merged into the conviction for assault with intent to murder).
Shell v. State, 307 Md. 46, 57-58, 512 A.2d 358, 363-64 (1986).
Id. at 57, 512 A.2d at 363.
378 Md. 461, 836 A.2d 627 (2003).
Id. at 495, 836 A.2d at 647. Taha sued Southern Management Corporation
(SMC) and two individual employees of SMC for malicious prosecution. ld. at
469-70, 836 A.2d at 632. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the individual
employees, but found the employer liable for damages. Id. at 473-75,836 A.2d
at 634-35. The Court of Appeals held that these verdicts were irreconcilably
inconsistent under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 467, 836 A.2d at
630. In fact, several other states have adopted policies similar to Taha in regard
to inconsistent civil verdicts. !d. at 488·89,836 A.2d at 643.
ld. at 487, 836 A.2d at 642.

408

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 35

another day the issue of whether this Court should reconsider its
decision in criminal matters in which inconsistent verdicts have
been rendered."lo9 This could be interpreted to imply a willingness
on the part of the Court of Appeals to reexamine its position on
inconsistent verdicts.
C.

Jury Instructions Regarding Inconsistent Verdicts

Maryland courts have recognized, however, that inconsistent
verdicts are not desirable and that an instruction from the presiding
judge to render only consistent verdicts is beneficial in order to
avoid convictions which are contrary to law. 110 According to the
court, such an instruction is justified because "the jury retains its
power to err, either fortuitously or deliberately, and to compromise
or exercise lenity. It, therefore, retains the power to be the final
arbiter in the determination of which, if any, of the crimes charged
the accused is guilty." III
V. OTHER JURISDICTIONS' APPROACHES TO
INCONSISTENT VERDICTS
In determining how Maryland should approach inconsistent
verdicts, it is helpful to analyze other jurisdictions' approaches to
the same issue. The vast majority of jurisdictions in the United
States have followed the holding laid out by the Supreme Court in
Powell v. United States. I 12 This comment will focus on Alaska,
Florida, and New York as they are the only jurisdictions that do
These
not automatically affirm inconsistent verdicts. I 13
jurisdictions each take unique approaches to dealing with
inconsistent verdicts. While Alaska has taken a more liberal
approach by not requiring strict consistency, 114 Florida and New
York attempt to differentiate between types of inconsistent
verdicts I 15 and in doing so raise questions of policy and
practicality.

109.
110.
Ill.

112.
113.

114.
115.

Id. at 488 n.8, 836 A.2d at 642 n.8.
Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583,597,479 A.2d 1344, 1351 (1984).
Id. at 597, 479 A.2d at 1351. This justification is incongruous, as verdicts that
are rendered through compromise, mistake, or lenity are not actually in
accordance with the law. See supra Part III.A--C.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See injra Part V.A-B. Until fairly recently the minority of jurisdictions that
rejected the holdings of Powell and Dunn was more substantial. See, e.g., People
v. lones, 797 N.E.2d 640, 644-47 (Ill. 2003) (overruling People v. Klingenberg,
665 N.E.2d 1370 (Ill. 1996) (declining to follow Powell)); State v. Ng, 750 P.2d
632, 639-40 (Wash. 1988) (overruling State v. O'Neil, 167 P.2d 471 (Wash.
1946) (holding that inconsistent verdicts must be reversed».
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.s.
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Alaska

In 1970, the Supreme Court of Alaska held in DeSacia v.
. may not rend
' ly 'mconslstent
.
State 116 th at'Junes
er stnct
ver d'IctS. 117
DeSacia was convicted of the manslaughter of Evangelista and
acquitted of the manslaughter of Hogan. 118 Both men were
occupants of the same pickup truck which was traveling ahead of
DeSacia's vehicle. 1I9 While driving at night on a gravel road at
high speeds, DeSacia moved into the left lane and attemRted to
pass the pickup truck occupied by Evangelista and Hogan. I 0 As a
result, Hogan lost control of the car and drove off the road and into
the bordering river-killing both men. 121
Based on the
circumstances, the court found that the two verdicts were
"irreconcilably in conflict"122 as there was no conceivable way
DeSacia's actions toward Evangelista were in any way different
from his conduct toward Hogan. 123
The court could not find any basis on which to assume that
inconsistent verdicts are the result of lenity or that there was only
an occasional risk of compromise verdicts. 124 The court concluded
"[t]he truth is simply that we do not know, nor do we have any
way of telling, how many inconsistent verdicts are attributable to
feelings of leniency, to compromise, or, for that matter, to outright
confusion on the part of the jury." 125
The court held that DeSacia's acquittal had to stand as the
Double Jeopardy Clause prevents retrial on that count, but ordered
a retrial on the conviction as collateral estoppel did not apply. 126
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

123.

124.
125.
126.

469 P.2d 369 (Alaska 1970).
Id. at 378.
ld. at 370.
ld.
ld.
/d. at 370-71.
ld. at 373. The court never specifically used the terms "factual inconsistency."
See generally DeSacia, 469 P.2d 369. However, the DeSacia verdict is a classic
example of a factually inconsistent verdict. See supra note 16 and accompanying
text.
DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 373-74. It should be noted that the crime charged in both
indictments stemmed from the same alleged misconduct of DeSacia, specifically
"his criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle." ld. at 373. Furthermore,
the court noted, "it is virtually impossible to maintain that DeSacia was more
negligent toward one or the other of the victims." ld. at 374.
ld. at 377.
ld.
Id. at 381. The court reasoned it was unfair to allow the appellant to successfully
argue that the inconsistency renders his conviction meaningless and to also
maintain there was sufficient certainty to preclude retrial due to collateral
estoppel. /d. The court believed that allowing the appellant to invoke collateral
estoppel would "convert the guarantee of double jeopardy from a shield into a
sword." Jd. (quoting United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir.
1960».
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Three years later the court noted that the level of inconsistency
required by DeSacia to merit reversal is quite high. 127 Also,
Alaskan courts have held that if a party or defendant wishes to
challenge a jury's verdict on the basis that it is inconsistent, the
challenge must be made prior to the jury's dismissal. 128
B.

Florida and New York

While Alaska treats all forms of inconsistent verdicts as an error
to be cured at the trial level,129 Florida and New York take a
different approach in that both states differentiate between
different types of inconsistencies when determining whether a
New York reverses both
reversible error has occurrcd. l3O
compound and lesser-included inconsistencies based on a fairly
concrete definition, but recognizes an exception to this rule and
refuses to reverse compound inconsistencies involving felony
murder. 131 However, even though Florida relies on essentially the
same definition for identifying impermissible inconsistency as
New York, 132 Florida jurisprudence only calls for the reversal of
compound
inconsistencies
and
not
lesser
included
inconsistencies. 133
1.

New York

New York draws a distinction between types of inconsistent
verdicts-those verdicts that are merely inconsistent and those that
are "repugnant.,,134 Merely inconsistent verdicts may stand in New
127.

128.

129.
130.

\31.
\32.
133.
\34.

Oaygce v. State, 514 P.2d 1159, 1168 (Alaska 1973) (affirming defendant's
conviction and finding the facts of the case did not meet "the high level of
inconsistency" required by DeSacia to merit reversal). See also Roberts v. State,
680 P.2d 503, 506 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (noting that the inconsistency present
in DeSacia was "obvious and unmistakable").
See Roberts, 680 P.2d at 507 (holding "that claims of inconsistent jury verdicts in
criminal cases will not be considered on appeal unless an objection" is made to
the trial court prior to the jury's dismissal); City of Homer v. Land's End Marine,
459 P.2d 475, 480 (Alaska 1969) ("The rule that objection on the grounds of
inconsistency is waived by failure to move for resubmission promotes the fair and
expeditious correction of error." (quoting Cundiff v. Washburn, 393 F.2d 505,
507 (7th Cir. 1968»).
See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.B.I-2. Some commentators believe, however, that there is no
real basis for treating these "types" of inconsistent verdicts differently as both
results are illogical and both have the possibility of wrongful convictions.
Kimberly Nolen Hopkins, Criminal Law, When Is an inconsistent Verdict Not
Inconsistent?, 74 FLA. BAR J. 42, 44 (2000) (stating that "only legal minds would
be able to see a difference where none 'truly' exists").
See infra Part V.8.1.
See infra notes 135, 146 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
Wax, supra note 4, at 714-16.
The term "repugnant" has been used
interchangeably with the term inconsistent in New York. People v. Hodge, 802
N.Y.S.2d 613, 615 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
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York, while verdicts that are considered "repugnant" will be
reversed. 135
In People v. Tucker 136 the Court of Appeals of New York
defined a repugnant verdict as one "where acquittal on one crime
as charged to the jury is conclusive as to a necessary element of the
other crime, as charged, for which the guilty verdict was
rendered."l37 Additionally, the court held that in order to
determine whether a verdict is repugnant, the appellate courts must
only examine the instructions given to the jury, regardless of the
accuracy of the instruction. 138 The court must then determine
whether the jury, based upon the instructions that it received,
"must have reached an inherently self-contradictory verdict.,,139
Furthermore, New York case law requires that defendants register
a protest on the issue of repugnancy prior to the discharge of the
jury when any inconsistencies could be remedied by resubmission
to the jury. 140
Applying the definition laid out in Tucker, New York allows
both compound and lesser included inconsistencies to be reversed.
However, in the context of felony murder, a traditionally
compound offense, New York law makes a substantial deviation.
In New York if a defendant is acquitted of the underlying felony
but convicted of felony murder, the conviction will not be
vacated. 141 This is based on the finding that the completion of the
underlying felony is not an essential element of felony murder. 142
In fact, the Court of Appeals of New York described them as
"substantively and generically entirely separate and disconnected
offenses." 143 Justifying this statement, the court explained that the
underlying felony "functions as a replacement for the mens rea ...
necessary [to commit] common-law murder" and not an actual
element of the crime. 144
135.
136.
137.

138.
139.
140.

141.

142.
143.
144.

People v. Tucker, 431 N.E.2d 617, 619 (N. Y. 1981) ("Allowing such a verdict to
stand is not merely inconsistent with justice, but is repugnant to it.").
431 N.E.2d 617.
Jd. at 619. The court adopted the definition proposed by Steven T. Wax in his
1979 law review article on inconsistent verdicts. See Wax, supra note 4, at 74042.
Tucker, 431 N.E.2d at 619-20.
Jd. at 620.
People v. Sadoff, 437 N.E.2d 271, 272 (N.Y. 1982) (mem.). See also People v.
Hines, 502 N.Y.S.2d 271, 272 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (finding that defendant
waived his right to challenge the verdict based on repugnancy by not raising the
issue when the trial court had the opportunity to resubmit the case to the jury).
See People v. Murray, 459 N.Y.S.2d 810, 812 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
People v. Ponder, 433 N.Y.S.2d 288, 293 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 429
N.E.2d 735 (N.Y. 1981).
People v. Berzups, 402 N.E.2d 1155, 1160 (N.Y. 1980) (quoting People v.
Nichols, 129 N.E. 883, 884 (N.Y. 1921)).
Jd. The court explained that "[t]his view accords with the historical development
of the felony murder doctrine and the legislative policy reflected in its current
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Florida

It is perhaps an understatement to call Florida's approach to
inconsistent verdicts puzzling.145 Initially, the Supreme Court of
Florida adopted the Dunn holding in 1946. 146 But then in 1979 the
court, apparently, but not explicitly reversing itself, recognized an
exception to the general rule for "true" inconsistencies. 147
According to this rule, Florida courts will not uphold truly
inconsistent verdicts, which the court defines as those verdicts
where an acquittal on one count negates an element necessary to
sustain a conviction on a separate count. 148 While Florida has
allowed an exception for "truly" inconsistent verdicts, it has
specifically refused to extend the exception to what it refers to as
factually inconsistent verdicts. 149

This distinction between a factual inconsistency and true
inconsistency IS actually quite blurry based on Florida's
jurisprudence. ISO Florida defines a factual inconsistency as one
which, while defying logic, can still legally stand because one
acquittal does not preclude a conviction upon another count. J5I
Using this definition, those inconsistencies that arise in the context

145.
146.
147.

148.

149.

150.

151.

statutory descendant, both of which underscore the fact that the corpus of the
crime is the killing of another." Id.
See Hopkins, supra note 130, at 42 (referring to Florida's jurisprudence on the
matter of inconsistent verdicts as an "enigma wrapped around [aJ riddle").
Goodwin v. State, 26 So. 2d 898, 899 (Fla. 1946).
Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158,1160-61 (Fla. 1979) (holding that a conviction
for felony murder must be vacated if the jury acquits the defendant of the
underlying felony charge bccause thc acquittal constitutes a specific finding of
the non-existence of that felony).
Hopkins, supra note 130, at 44; Gonzalez v. State, 440 So. 2d 514, 515 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983). See also Eaton v. State, 438 So. 2d 822,823 (Fla. 1983) ("[Juries
are J required to return consistent verdicts as to the guilt of an individual on
interlocking charges.").
State v. Connelly, 748 So. 2d 248,252 (Fla. 1999). The Florida Supreme Court
held that such an extension would be contrary to precedent. Id. In Reid v. Slate,
the court said it had "recognized only one exception to the general rule allowing
inconsistent verdicts." 799 So. 2d 394, 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). In
Gonzalez, the court held that convicting defendant of robbery with a firearm
while acquitting defendant of possession of a firearm during commission of
felony did not require reversal as the latter is not a necessary clement of the
former. 440 So. 2d at 516. The court justified its holding stating, "[ w]hile it may
be true that one cannot be convicted of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony if it has been legally established that no felony took
place, the converse is not true, at least in our view." Id.
See Hopkins, supra note 130, at 44-46. Much of the confusion likely arises based
on the terminology used by Florida courts. The situation this comment calls a
lesser included inconsistency, Florida courts refer to as a factual inconsistency.
See infra note 151 and accompanying text. Furthermore, what this comment
identifies as a compound inconsistency is referred to by Florida courts as a
"legal" or "true" inconsistency. See Hopkins, supra note 130, at 44.
In other words, one count is not the predicate count to the compound offense, but
rather is a lesser included offense. See, e.g., Fayson v. State, 698 So. 2d 825,
826-27 (Fla. 1997).
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of lesser-included offenses would be considered permissible
inconsistency while compound inconsistencies would not be
considered permissible.
The case of Redondo v. State lS2 provides an excellent example.
In Redondo, the court held that the verdict was truly
inconsistent. 153 In this case the defendant was found guilty of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, but was
acquitted of the underlying felony of aggravated assault. IS4 The
count of aggravated assault was the predicate felony that was
needed to support his conviction on the compound offense of
possession. ISS The court held that such a finding by the jury could
not stand as the conviction on the compound offense "must stand
or fall in conjunction with the underlying felony.,,156
While both Alaska and Florida consider inconsistent verdicts
reversible error, their reasoning and methods of dealing with such
verdicts could not be more different. 157 The Florida case of
Naumowicz v. State 158 is illustrative as it stands in stark contrast to
Alaska's holding in DeSacia. In Naumowicz, a Florida appellate
court found it was not impermissibly inconsistent to acquit the
defendant of nUl manslaughter for the death of the driver of
another car and to convict the defendant of DUI manslaughter for
the death of the passenger of the defendant's car. 159 The cases of
DeSacia and Naumowicz are highly analogous-both cases
involved two deaths which resulted from the same negligent act of
one culpable defendant. 160
Interestingly, DeSacia and Naumowicz resulted in polar
opposite resolutions. 161 Alaska makes no such distinction between
types of inconsistent verdicts and considers cases like Naumowicz

152.

153.
154.
155.
156.

157.
158.

159.
160.

161.

403 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1981).
Id. at 956.
Id. at 955 (the jury only convicted him of the lesser included offense of simple
battery on the aggravated battery count).
Id. at 955-56.
Id. at 956. See also Mahaun v. State, 377 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 1979)(holding that a
conviction for felony murder must be set aside when the jury has not convicted
the defendant of the underlying felony).
See supra Part V.A-B.
562 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
Id. at 713.
See supra notes 116-23, 158-59 and accompanying text. In both cases it could
not plausibly be argued that the defendant was more negligent toward one victim
than towards another and yet the defendant was only found guilty in the death of
one victim. See supra notes 122-23, 158-59 and accompanying text.
DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 396, 381 (Alaska 1970) (ordering a new trial for
conviction that had been reversed due to inconsistency); Naumowicz, 562 So. 2d
at 713 (affirming jury's inconsistent acquittal).
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and DeSacia reversible error,162 whereas Florida only allows for
the reversal of compound inconsistencies. 163
VI. DEFINING AN INCONSISTENT VERDICT FOR USE IN
MARYLAND
Florida's treatment of inconsistent verdicts provides the classic
cautionary tale-what cannot be identified accurately cannot be
prevented with any consistency. In order to prevent confusion,
trial courts must be given concrete standards that can be used to
identify those inconsistencies that are factual and those that are
legal. This section will explain why only legally inconsistent
verdicts should be prevented and it will then propose a specific
definition for adoption in Maryland.

A.

Which Type ofInconsistency Should Be Forbidden: Factual,
Legal or Both?

Maryland should forbid both forms of legally inconsistent
verdicts, while factually inconsistent verdicts, those aberrations
resulting from a lay body's irrational behavior, should be permitted
to stand. 164 By permitting factually inconsistent verdicts to stand,
the jury is permitted to perform its traditional function of
determining facts and assessing credibility.165 Allowing these
types of inconsistencies is also beneficial because it is consistent
with the concept that a jury is "an arbiter for the community" and
because it ensures the sanctity of the jury's verdict. 166 This also
avoids inquiries into juror's motives, intent, and understanding
which can only be based on speculation. 167 Moreover, permitting
reversals based upon the factuaVlegal distinction allows juries to
retain the power to act irrationally so long as it is done in
accordance with the criminal law and the requirements of due
process.

B.

How to Define a "Legally Inconsistent" Verdict

In order to ensure uniformity, Maryland should adopt an
explicit definition of what constitutes a legally inconsistent verdict.
The definition proposed by Steven T. Wax would be ideal for
Maryland: "[w]hen acquittal on one charge is conclusive as to an
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

DeSacia, 469 P.2d at 378 (stating that creating a distinction "tends to confuse
substance with semantics").
See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
Wax, supra note 4, at 741. Illogical or inconsistent applications of the facts
would not merit reversal. ld.
ld.
Id.
Id.
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element which is necessary to and inherent in a charge on which a
conviction has occurred, the conviction should be reversed.,,168
Using this definition, any factual aberrations would be pennitted
by trial courts so long as the verdicts did not create a statutory
contradiction. 169 Perhaps most importantly, this definition would
require Maryland courts to construe inconsistencies strictly in
terms of the criminal law and without speCUlating into the jury's
deliberations, motives or intent. 170
This definition is also
beneficial because it would require the reversal of both lesser· · · 171
. Iu ded an d compound
mc
mconslstencles.

VII. HOW TO DEAL WITH INCONSISTENT VERDICTS IN
MARYLAND
This comment proposed a definition for Maryland to adopt in
order to help identify legally inconsistent verdicts. However, the
inevitable next question is what to do with such a verdict once it
has been identified.
Eric Muller suggests three possible alternatives to the Supreme
Court's treatment of inconsistent verdicts in Powell: hannless
error review, refusing to accept such verdicts, and mistrial at the
This comment will explain these
defendant's option.172
alternatives in greater depth and then determine which alternative
would be best for Maryland to adopt. 173
A.

Harmless Error Review

In his article, Muller claims the best possible solution would be
to treat inconsistent jury verdicts as a variety of trial error, in
which the conviction will be reversed unless the error was
hannless to the defendant. 174 Commonly, when a defendant shows
an error has occurred at the trial level, the appellate court will be
compelled to reverse the conviction if the error was not
hannless. 175 Harmless error review requires federal appellate
168.
169.
170.
171.

172.
173.
174.
175.

/d. at 740 (emphasis in original).
/d.
See id. at 740-41.
See supra Part [I.A. (discussing compound and lesser-included inconsistencies).
Muller, supra note 2, at 821-22.

This determination will bc made under the assumption that the proposed
definition in Part VI. will be adopted in conjunction with the proposed procedure.
Muller, supra note 2, at 821-22.
ld. at 822. See O'Neal v. MCAninch, 5\3 U.S. 432, 435-42 (1995) (vacating
defendant's conviction and holding that if the court reviewing a habeas corpus
petition had grave doubts about whether an error in state court was harmless-it
was required to treat it as not being harmless error); Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18,24 (1967) (reversing defendant's murder conviction and holding it was
not harmless error for prosecutor to imply guilt from defendant's refusal to
testify).
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courts to find that the error did not have "substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." I 76
Muller favors this approach because it has more "teeth" than
sufficiency of the evidence review, the method relied upon by the
Supreme Court, because harmless error review does not consider
the evidence in a light most favorable to the state. 177 Essentially,
Muller believes that harmless error review, by invoking a higher
standard, will provide greater protection to criminal defendants
than a review of the sufficiency of the evidence. 178
Muller, however, admits to the greatest flaw of this proposed
solution. 179 Usually when harmless error review is employed,
appellate courts know that error has occurred and that this error has
harmed the defendant. 180 It is then the court's duty to determine
whether this error resulted in the defendant's conviction. 181 This
form of analysis allows reviewing judges to make a "tolerably
educated guess" as to whether or not the defendant was harmed by
the jury's improper actions. 182
Ultimately, this solution is less than ideal as it would require
judges to make case-by-case assessments and to rely on pure
conjecture as to the jury's true reasons for rendering an
inconsistent verdict. Furthermore, this system only allows reversal
of inconsistent verdicts the court deems "harmful," which could
presumably result in unequal treatment of similarly situated
defendants. This system would also ignore one of the main points
of this comment, which is that inconsistent verdicts in and of
themselves are harmful and should not be accepted regardless of an
appellate judge's subjective determination of harm to an individual
defendant.

176.

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946) (reversing defendant's
conviction for conspiracy where trial court committed error by improperly
combining trials of multiple defendants). In Dorsey v. Slate, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland concluded that when an error has been proven the court
must be able to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way
influenced the verdict and was harmless, otherwise the verdict must be reversed.
276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976).
Muller, supra note 2, at 824.
ld.
ld. at 824-25.
ld. at 825.
ld.
ld. at 825-26. Muller argues that this is similar to the court's function in
determining whether erroneously admitted evidence prejudiced the outcome. Id.
The court can never know what weight the jury afforded to that particular piece
of evidence and so is required to make a reasonable guess. Id.
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Mistrial at the Defendant's Option

Muller's second proposed solution is to allow individual
defendants to declare a mistrial at their own option. 183 This would
allow defendants to determine whether their interests are best
served by accepting or rejecting the inconsistent verdict. 184 Using
this option, defendants would be required to either accept the entire
verdict, presumably including an inconsistent acquittal and
conviction, or reject the entire verdict. 185 If the defendant elected
to reject the entire verdict, he or she would then move for a mistrial
and be subject to retrial on all counts at the discretion of the
state. 186 Muller argues that this solution is fair to defendants
because the defendant is in a far better position than the appellate
courts to know whether the jury "punished her with a groundless
conviction or pardoned her with an unwarranted acquittal.,,187
On its face, this proposal would seem to violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause since the government would be allowed to retry a
case after the jury has already announced a verdict of acquittal. 188
Generally, however, when a defendant successfully moves for a
mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause will not bar the state from
retrying the case. 189 The Supreme Court noted that the important
factor is that it is the defendant who "retain[s] primary control over
the course to be followed in the event of ... error.,,190
The solution proposed by Muller leaves the defendant with the
ultimate choice of action, thereby not depriving him of his Double
Jeopardy right. 191 While this solution is feasible and certainly fair

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

189.

190.

191.

ld. at 822, 831-32.
ld. at 822, 832.
ld. at 832.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 833. The Double Jeopardy Clause has been held to apply to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794
(1969). While the Maryland Constitution does not specifically provide Double
Jeopardy protection, its common law docs. State v. Woodson, 338 Md. 322, 32728, 658 A.2d 272, 275 (1995).
United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607, 608-12 (1976) ("A motion by the
defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to rcprosecution, even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or
judicial error. ").
Jd. at 609. Furthermore, the Double Jeopardy Clause only prevents retrial on an
acquittal after that verdict is final. Muller, supra note 2, at 829. See also Heinze
v. State, 184 Md. 613, 616, 42 A.2d 128, 130 (1945) ("It is a fundamental
principle that the verdict of a jU1)' in a criminal case has no effect in law until it is
recorded and finally accepted by the court."). Furthermore, in Maryland, a
verdict does not become final until after the jU1)' has been polled and its verdict is
accepted by the court. Smith v. State, 299 Md. 158, 168, 472 A.2d 988, 993
(1984).
Muller, supra note 2, at 833.
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to defendants, it is not ideal because it lacks the simplicity of other
alternatives.
C.

Refusal by Trial Court to Accept Inconsistent Verdicts

Another alternative proposed by Muller requires trial judges to
refuse to accept inconsistent verdicts and to require juries to cure
their error. 192 This approach would be best for Maryland to adopt
as its case law has already demonstrated a tendency to favor this
approach to jury verdicts. 193 The Maryland Rules already permit
judges to discharge the jury or require further deliberation if the
verdict is not unanimous upon polling. 194 Additionally, it is
generally accepted in Maryland that verdicts which are defective in
form or substance should not be accepted by the trial court. 195
In Heinze, the Court of Appeals declared, "[i]t is essential for
the prompt and efficient administration of justice to prevent
defective verdicts from being entered upon the records of the court
as well as to ascertain the real intention of the jury in their
finding."I96
The court said it was, therefore, the judge's
responsibility to explain the defect in the verdict to the jury and to
allow them the option to remedy it by returning to deliberations or
by clarifying their verdict in the presence of the court. 197
In addition to Maryland's openness to this procedure, this
option presents the simplest and the most efficient means of
preventing inconsistent verdicts as it minimizes the role of
appellate courts. Requiring defendants to raise objections to
inconsistent verdicts at the trial level will help ensure that juries
are given the opportunity to correct inconsistencies prior to their
polling and dismissal. 198

192.

193.
194.

195.
196.
197.

198.

Muller, supra note 2, at 827. See also FED. R. Crv. P. 49(b) ("When the answers
are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the
general verdict, judgment shaH not be entered, but the court shall return the jury
for furthcr consideration of its answers and verdict or shall order a new trial.").
In order for judges to identity which verdicts are unacceptably inconsistent the
previously proposed definition should be employed. See supra Part VI.B.
See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
MD. RULE § 4-327(c) ("Ifthcjurors do not unanimously concur in the verdict, the
court may direct the jury to retire for further deliberation, or may discharge the
jury if satisfied that a unanimous verdict cannot be reached.").
Heinze, 184 Md. at 617, 42 A.2d at 130.
Id.
ld. at 617-18, 42 A.2d at 130. The court noted it would be "safer" to send the
jury back to the deliberation room with instructions concerning necessary
corrections, so that further consideration could be conducted without outside
influences. Jd. at 618, 42 A.2d at 130-31.
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

The reasons cited by the Supreme Court to protect inconsistent
verdicts-mistake, compromise, and lenity-do not prove worthy
of protection in the face of the harm posed to defendants by
inconsistent jury verdicts.
In formulating an approach for
Maryland, it would be prudent to borrow concepts from each of the
states which currently allow reversal of inconsistent verdicts.
New York and Florida provide helpful guidance when
formulating an approach for Maryland by showing the importance
of providing a concrete definition when drawing distinctions
between forms of inconsistent verdicts. Following their lead, but
embellishing upon it slightly, Maryland should refuse to accept
only legally inconsistent verdicts, including both compound and
lesser included inconsistencies, in accordance with the proposed
definition that would rely primarily on statutory analysis.
Meanwhile, Alaska and New York demonstrate an efficient means
of dealing with legally inconsistent verdicts by requiring those
inconsistencies to be cured at the trial level as the court will refuse
to accept compound and lesser-included inconsistencies in the
verdict. This two-pronged approach will work together to ensure
that inconsistent verdicts are uniformly recognized and not entered
as judgment.
In summation, Maryland should break ranks with the majority
of its sister states and declare legally inconsistent jury verdicts
invalid as they are fundamentally unfair to defendants, go against
major principles of law, and defy logic.
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